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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to delineate the economic and political aspects of 
Turkey’s EU membership. The main finding is that although Turkey has made 
great strides towards EU membership concerning the economic criteria 
through its economic reform, there has not been made the same progress in 
the political field because of major obstacles described in Chapter 3. Turkey’s 
economic profile is provided in Chapter 2 through comparisons to other 
already EU or EU pre-accession countries in basic economic figures, in which 
Turkey’s dynamic in many cases is obvious. Chapter 4 summarizes the main 
points of the recent Turkey’s progress in economic and political terms, which 
confirms that Turkey has still a lot to do (especially in the political field) in 
order to reach full EU membership.  
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EU-TURKEY 
RELATIONS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
It is widely approved that relations between Turkey and Europe have 
undergone strong fluctuations during the past decades. Although great efforts 
have been made towards EU integration, these efforts have many times been 
stained by actions of political uncertainty, strong tension and domestic 
violence.  
    It is also true that the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership has 
influenced positively its internal transformation in many domains of economic 
political and social life. Of course there are also some other domestic factors 
which have enabled its domestic transformation, but many agree that relations 
with the EU are the most important ones. 
 
1.2 The Ankara Agreement  
 
Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 and is considered Turkey’s first 
step towards the then European Economic Community (EEC).The agreement 
contained Turkey’s connection with the EU in three stages: 
•     During the first stage (preparatory stage, 1964-1969) Turkey was 
offered economic privileges concerning the exports of traditional agricultural 
products. The only obligation Turkey had during this period was to 
demonstrate and achieve an economic development and make preparation 
for the second stage. During this stage no problems were reported. 
•     The second stage (transitional stage) is considered a preparatory 
stage towards Customs Union which was signed in 1995. The transitional 
stage was established with the signature of the Additional Protocol in Brussels 
(23 Nov 1970) and covered trade and financial commitments between EU and 
Turkey. During this period Turkey was granted tariff quotas but they did not 
prove as effective as expected. The Agreement was aligned with the then 
EEC directives. Turkey was excluded from political decisions which caused its 
recourse to the European Court of Justice.    
 
 1.3 The Copenhagen Criteria 
 
The Copenhagen criteria (21-22 June 1993), (Emerson M. ,2004) are 
summarized to the fact that stability of institutions and the existence of market 
economy are basic factors for a country to reach EU membership. 
Although Turkey has undergone a great transformation in its 
constitution and established seven harmonisation packages, barriers such as 
penal system and judiciary still exist. Many believe that further transformation 
will take years for Turkey to meet the Criteria but these criteria will definitely 
pave the way for the opening of negotiations. 
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1.4 The Customs Union 
 
Turkey entered the Customs union in 1996. Customs Union was a 
further step for Turkey to reach EU membership, which foresaw the 
liberalization of industrial tariffs and Turkey’s alignment with the Community 
legislation and Community policy towards third countries. In this way relations 
between Turkey and EU became stronger. 
 
1.5 Deterioration in Turkey-EU Relations 
 
    In 1997 the European Council decided that Turkey does not meet the 
criteria for EU membership. This was the second blow for Turkey after 1989 
and deteriorated further the relationship with the EU. Although Turkey never 
forgot the target of EU membership, did not operate remarkable 
transformations in its domestic mechanisms to change the already negative 
atmosphere and as a result Turkey’s progress was real slow.   
 
1.6   The Helsinki Agreement 
 
The negative atmosphere that had already been created was reversed 
in 1999 in Helsinki, where Turkey gained its EU candidacy. This event was far 
from the opening of the negotiations because European Council considered 
that Turkey had to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria first. It also paved the way for the 
integration procedures of thirteen countries. 
The participation of a Muslim country in the Christian club of the 
European Union (Marias E., 2005), was accepted for the first time through the 
Helsinki Agreement according to which all candidate countries: 
• Participate in EU membership procedures in equal terms. 
• Have to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. 
• Have to accept the principles and political civilization of the EU 
• Have to respect the principle of the peaceful resolution of all 
conflicts without the use of violence in front of the International Court of 
Justice.  
Additionally, the reinforcement of EU-Turkey relations depends on: 
• The continuation of the economical and political reforms in order to 
adjust its patterns and practices concerning the human rights area, to the 
patterns and practices of the European Union. 
• The respect and protection of the minorities. 
• The conflict resolution, especially through the International Court 
Justice. 
• The negotiations support taking place under the auspices of the 
United Nations Organization (UNO), concerning the resolution of the Cyprus 
problem.  
 
1.7 The Years before the opening of Negotiations 
 
The years before the Opening of the Negotiations were crucial for 
Turkey because: 
• Many constitutional articles were revised. 
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• Another legal harmonization package was approved mainly 
concerning human rights (right to broadcast and teach in foreign languages, 
religious minorities, abolition of death penalty e.t.c.) 
• New constitutional reform was made. 
• Additional legislative harmonization packages were approved. 
• New penal code was approved. 
• Numerous laws and regulations were revised.    
 
All these transformations took place mostly during the years 2003 and 
2004 in an area that represent the ‘’deep’’ Turkish legal and political system 
and paved the way for the opening of Negotiations in October 2005. The 
European Council also decided that the transformation in Turkey should be 
ongoing and that its performance should be monitored through yearly EU 
Commission reports (EU Commission, 2005). The main focus should be given 
on political reforms that had to do with judiciary and essential rights.   
During the years 2006 and 2007 there has been noted a considerable 
slowdown in the transformation process (due to prosecutions limiting the 
freedom of expression), which undermined Turkey’s EU membership. The fact 
that Turkey denied to include Republic of Cyprus in its amended customs 
union protocol brought about the suspension of the negotiations with Turkey 
in eight chapters of the acquis and spread a lack of confidence among EU 
members.    
 
 1.8 The Opening of Negotiations 
 
    The Opening of the Negotiations (Joseph J., 2006), (EU Commission, 
2005) took place on October 2005 and was based on the “acquis 
communautaire”, which includes the following chapters:   
 
• Free movement of goods 
• Freedom of movement for workers 
• Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 
• Free movement of capital 
• Public procurement 
• Company law 
• Intellectual property law 
• Competition policy 
• Financial services 
• Information society and media 
• Agriculture and rural development 
• Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 
• Fisheries 
• Transport policy 
• Energy 
• Taxation 
• Economic and monetary policy 
• Statistics 
• Social policy and employment 
• Enterprise and industrial policy 
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• Trans-European networks 
• Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments 
• Judiciary and fundamental rights 
• Justice, freedom and security 
• Science and research 
• Education and culture 
• Environment 
• Consumer and health protection 
• Customs union 
• External relations 
• Foreign, security and defence policy 
• Financial control 
• Financial and budgetary provisions 
• Institutions 
• Other issues 
 
 
   The EU Commission is responsible to monitor the progress of Turkey 
concerning the above chapters and issue Turkey’s yearly progress report, 
which plays a significant role to Turkey’s EU membership. 
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CHAPTER 2:  ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF TURKEY 
 
2.1 Macroeconomic factors 
 
2.1.1 Population and economy size  
 
Turkey’s population is about 70 million, one of the largest 
countries in Europe. Many experts believe that the population growth rate will 
slow down in the next decades. Whether this forecast is true or not the fact is 
that birth rates are low in regions where the average income of the population 
is high or close to average income of the European countries and high were 
the average income is extremely low. The example of other countries shows 
that governments whose policies are family oriented present a considerable 
growth on population. (Neyer G., 2003). 
Turkey’s economy is large regarding its immediate neighbours: 
Greece. Romania, Bulgaria and FYROM, Table 1 compares those countries’ 
GDP. In 2009, Turkey’s GDP amounted to 443.76 Mrd Euros compared to 
245.9 for Greece, 118.39 for Romania and 35 for Bulgaria, which already are 
EU member states.  
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product at current market 
prices 
UNIT: Bn Euros 
COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
TURKEY 351.8 391.2 440.84 443.76 
GREECE 213.2 228.2 242.9 245.9 
ROMANIA 78.65 97 118.44 118.39 
BULGARIA 25.24 28.87 34 35 
FYROM 4.97 5.66 6.37 6.66 
1 RO LEI=0.235 Euro, 1 MKD=0.016 Euro, 1 BU LEVA=0.511 Euro, 1 TYL=0.464 Euro 
Source: EU AMECO, own calculations 
 
According to Table 2, Turkey’s population is certainly not the 
poorest in terms of GDP per head of population: measured in Euros per head 
of population, it stood at 6.16 in 2009. Only one country in its immediate 
neighborhood has much higher GDP per head of population:  Greece 21.79 in 
2009. Bulgaria and Romania which are already EU member states are more 
or less in the same category. 
 
Table 2 
Gross domestic product per head 
of population at current market 
prices 
UNIT: Euros per head of popu-
lation 
COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Turkey 4.88 5.43 6.12 6.16 
Greece 18.89 20.22 21.52 21.79 
Bulgaria 3.66 4.52 5.519 5.51 
Romania 3.32 3.807 4.48 4.61 
FYROM 2.41 2.75 3.099 3.24 
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1 RO LEI=0.235 Euro, 1 MKD=0.016 Euro, 1 BU 
LEVA=0.511 Euro, 1 TYL=0.464 Euro 
Source: EU AMECO own calculations 
 
2.1.2 Macro economic growth 
 
Although Turkey is believed to be highly unstable, possesses 
many dynamic factors. Dynamic factors exist in the real sector of the economy 
such as real growth of GDP and define the potential of its economy. Lack of 
stability has been caused because of the internal political turmoil and extreme 
fluctuations, Turkey has experienced especially after World War II.    
According to the UNDP human development index (UNDP, 
2002), there has been a significant reduction in poverty and living conditions 
over the past decades. A great difference in the incomes between the richest 
and the poorest part of population also exists. Its ratio is 8 in Turkey, 5.5 in 
Austria and 4.7 in Germany. 
Additionally Turkey experienced a high growth between 1981 
and 1987 and a remarkable development during the period 1990-1993. 
Between 1995 and 1997 growth was also positive while in 2001 there has 
been noted a sharp decline in GDP. The results for the years 2002 and 2003 
were also positive and the year 2004 prepared the country for the opening of 
the negotiations.  
The so-called instability is mainly connected with price and 
exchange rate instability due to high inflation. Although in some cases the 
danger of a hyperinflation was existing in 1994 and 1997, it finally never took 
place. The inflation after 1997 started to recede steadily. The main reason 
that brought about the inflation was the nominal depreciation which in turn 
increased the amount of imports and caused inflationary results. Another 
reason which increased the inflation was the fact that protectionism (up to 
Customs Union entry) caused significant barriers to specific segments of 
economy. On the other hand (Kibritçioğlu A., 2002) a deterioration in public 
governance might cause increasing inflation.  
 
2.1.3 Public debt and 2001 economic crisis 
 
        In 1999 a reform programme was set up in cooperation with the 
IMF but it lacked sufficient currency reserves (Alper A., 2001). For further 
success an unremitting flow of good news was essential. The bad news 
according to which the current account deficit increased in the late 2000 and 
problems in the banking sector, prevented the success of the reform 
programme. In 2001 the Turkish currency devaluated sharply and the public 
increased. 
As we can see in the Graph 1 below in 2001 the net external 
debt amounted to 38,20% and in 2003 decreased  to 22,2 % while the net 
domestic debt amounted  to 52,80% in 2001 and  decreased to 48,3% in 
2003. 
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Graph 1: Public sector net debt in % of GDP, 2000 to 2003 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Fiscal and monetary policy 
 
The main target of the Turkish government has been taking 
actions against public debt. This could be achieved either by cutting 
expenditures or by increasing revenues mainly through taxation. According to 
some experts the first is more popular than the latter. But how can a 
government be popular if it decides to decrease the amount of money it 
spends for pension, health, farming subsides disappointing in that way its 
electoral base? This is a reasonable problem that can arise but can be faced 
through firm political stability matched with economic stability. Another 
solution could be the improvement of tax collection mechanisms without 
necessarily meaning that the tax scale must be increased. But this 
presupposes that no corruption exists, something that it is extremely difficult.   
        On the other hand, firm prices are the target of Turkish monetary 
policy. For the time being the exchange rate is stable but the generic situation 
is fragile. This can attract external investors and the capital inflows can very 
easily fuel appreciation tendencies. Consequently the whole situation could 
damage Turkey’s international competitiveness. 
 
2.1.5 The structure of the current account 
 
According to Table 3 as we move to 2008 the deficit follows an 
increasing course and culminates by the end of 2008. Therefore, even under 
conditions of liberalized financial flows, it seems advisable to keep current 
account developments under close scrutiny.  
Within the current account, the trade balance has always been 
negative, with the deficit fluctuating considerably in a band between -22736 
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MD in 2004 and -62844 MD in 2008. The balance on goods and services has 
always been negative from 2004 to 2009. A clear trend is also visible with 
regard to transfer figures: the balance has always been positive moving from 
1117 MD in 2004 to 2006 MD in 2008.  
Additionally, not only have the goods exports improved over time, 
but the proportion of imports covered by export revenues have also increased 
upwards.  
Table 3: Current account flows and balances in million dollars (MD) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
-14431 
 
 
-22088 
 
-32051 -38219 -41289 
A-1 Goods exports 
 
68535 
 
78365 93611. 115364 140999 
A-2 
 
Goods imports 
 
 
-91271 
 
-111366 -134573 -162041 -193843 
A-a Balance on Goods 
 
-22736 
 
-33001 -40962 -46677 -52844 
A-3 Services credit 22941 26757 25407 28615 34807 
A-4 Services debt 
 
-10144 
 
-11423 -11713 -15292 -17294 
A-b Balance on Goods and Services 
 
-9939 
 
-17667 -27268 -33354 -35331 
A-5 Income credit 
 
2651 
 
3608 4383 6420 6880 
A-6 Income debt 
 
-8260 
 
-9483 -11074 -13528 -14844 
A-c Balance on Goods Services and Income 
 
-15548 
 
-23542 -33959. -40462 -43295 
A-7 Current transfers 
 
1117 
 
1454 1908 2243 2006 
Source:: CBRT (Central Bank of Republic of Turkey) 
 
2.1.6 Wages  
 
        The table 4 shows the wage share as percentage of GDP at 
current market prices, which depicts in a better way the potential of Turkey 
concerning the wage level, compared to other neighboring EU member or EU 
pre-accession countries. Turkey owns the last position among countries such 
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM and the percentage falls below 40% 
(39.1%) in the year 2009.    
Table 4 
Wage share as percentage of GDP at 
current market prices (Compensation per 
employee as percentage of GDP at market 
prices per person employed.) 
COUNTRY 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Turkey 43.7 42.7 41.7 42.7 40.6 39.1 
Greece 54 53.8 51.4 53.1 54.2 55.3 
Hungary 53.5 54 52.7 52.3 53.5 53.7 
Bulgaria 46.8 46.1 44.4 47 49.1 49.5 
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Romania 54.3 58.8 55.8 57.3 57.4 57.8 
Poland 49.4 48.2 47 45.8 47.5 47.8 
FYROM 49.2 45 47.8 41.6 42 40.5 
Source: EU AMECO 
 
 
2.1.7 Fiscal discipline concerning Growth and Stability Pact 
 
        As it is known, fiscal discipline is preserved within the Growth 
and Stability Pact in the EU by the following indicators: 
• (Public debt /GDP) x 100% < 60 % 
• (Public deficit/GDP)x 100% < 3 %  
The tables 5a, 5b below demonstrate the consolidated 
Gross Public Debt and the public deficit as % percentage of GDP among 
Turkey and other EU and pre-accession countries. As we can see, even if 
Turkey is not an EU member state, is in a better position than Greece and 
Cyprus in the 2009 concerning the public debt (42.7% versus 103.8 % for 
Greece and 47.5 % for Cyprus). Additionally Turkey has less public deficit (4.6 
%) in 2009 than Greece (5.1%) and Romania (5.1%) which are already EU 
member states.    
Table 5a 
Consolidated Gross Public 
Government Debt 
UNIT: % percentage of GDP COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Turkey 46.1 39.4 39.5 42.7 
Greece 95.9 94.8 97.6 103.8 
Cyprus 64.6 59.4 49.1 47.5 
Bulgaria 22.7 18.2 14.1 16 
Romania 12.4 12.7 13.6 18.2 
Croatia 35.7 33.1 33.5 34.6 
FYROM 31.4 23.4 21.4 25.2 
Source: EU AMECO 
 
Table 5b 
Public deficit-surplus 
UNIT: % percentage of GDP COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Turkey 2 deficit 4.3 surplus 1deficit 4.6 deficit 
Greece 2.9 deficit 3.6 deficit 5 deficit 5.1 deficit 
Cyprus 1.2 deficit 3.5 surplus 0.8 surplus 1.9 deficit 
Bulgaria 3 surplus 0.1 deficit 1.6 surplus 0.5 deficit 
Romania 2.2 deficit 2.6 deficit 5.4 deficit 5.1 deficit 
Croatia 3 deficit 0.5 surplus 1.3 deficit 1.6 deficit 
FYROM 0.6 deficit 1 deficit 0.9 deficit 3 deficit 
Source: EU Commission 
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2.2 Major inequalities in Turkey 
 
2.2.1 Income inequalities 
 
Turkey has a problem according to which there is a great 
difference in development between two geographic regions of the country. 
Specifically the western region is far more developed than the eastern one. As 
a result there is a great accumulation of capital in western region which 
influences in turn the per capita income of the population Domestic migration 
is very well spread.  Marmara region should have been more developed if so 
many people from the eastern poor regions of Turkey wouldn’t have been 
migrated to the western ones.   
        The domestic armed conflicts with Kurds in the eastern regions 
of Turkey diminish dramatically the prospect of development, creating a 
situation of panic and insecurity for the population who live there. Annual 
expenditures for the military amount to 5% of GDP, a figure which is 
extremely huge compared to the equivalent expenditures of Greece and USA.  
Nevertheless the government has put into action a plan to help 
and support the population who live in these underdeveloped areas. Most of 
the people working there receive financial bonus apart from their regular 
salary. A late study (Ögüt and Barbaros, 2003) though, concluded that such a 
plan brings about the opposite outcome: the developed regions of Turkey 
become even more developed.    
 
2.2.2 Labour market inequalities 
 
According to formal sources (Turkstat, 2009) employment rate in 
the Black Sea region is much higher than the national average. The main 
reason for this is that that specific region employs more than 60% of the total 
workforce in agricultural works. East Anatolia and the Marmara region come 
next with rates close to the country average.  
There is also a great difference in unemployment rates from 
region to region. Southern Anatolia demonstrates the highest rate of 
unemployment all over the country, mainly because of the reasons explained 
above. On the other hand eastern regions have low rates of unemployment, 
because of the high development and investments in these regions. 
Furthermore educated people, especially the young ones, face 
high rates of unemployment in Southern Anatolia, compared to all other 
regions of the country. Agricultural employment rate is higher in the Black Sea 
than in Marmara region. The lowest rate of employment in services owns the 
Black Sea region.    
 
2.3 Turkey’s foreign trade  
 
2.3.1 Imports exports and trade balance 
 
The graph 2 below presents the evolution of imports, exports and 
trade balance over the last fifteen years. As we can see the trade deficit is 
very low in 1994, 1991 and 2001 and then year by year becomes higher. In 
2008 Turkey has the highest trade deficit all over the past 14 years.  
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Graph 2: Total imports exports and trade balance 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
2.3.2 Trade balance by MDG regions. 
 
The Graph 3 below presents for 2008 the trade balance by 
regions according to the regions used in the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) Indicator Database. We can very easily notice that trade is positive for 
regions such as Western Asia, Northern Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa and South 
Eastern Europe and negative for the rest of the regions mentioned.  
 
2.3.3 Partner concentration of trade. 
 
The Graph 4 below (UN, COMTRADE, 2009) shows the partner 
concentration of imports and exports of Turkey for 2008.  
 
Graph 3: Trade Balance by MDG Regions 
in 2008 
Graph 4: Partner concentration of trade in 
2008 
 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
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2.3.4 Imports, exports of goods and services and trade deficit in 
relation to EU and EU pre-accession neighboring countries 
 
In terms of imports, exports of goods and services and trade 
deficit, Turkey economy is in the best position in comparison to its close or 
more remote Balkan neighbours: Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and FYROM. 
Table 6 compares those countries’ figures for the years 2006 to 2009. In 
2008, Turkey presented a surplus to its trade which amounted to 9.05 Mrd 
Euros compared to 21.5 Mrd Euros trade deficit for Greece, 14.98 for 
Romania and 7.77 for Bulgaria. 
A more representative situation is depicted in the Table 7 which 
shows the trade deficit as % of GDP, among the above mentioned countries. 
Turkey presents a 2% of GDP surplus trade in the year 2008, compared to 
8.85 % for Greece, 12.64 % for Romania, 22.8 % for Bulgaria (which are all 
already EU member states) and 26 5% for FYROM which is an EU pre-
accession country.     
Table 6: Imports, exports of goods and services, trade deficit 
UNIT: Bn Euros  
2006 2007 2008 2009 COUNTRY 
Imp Exp Trade Deficit Imp Exp 
Trade 
Deficit Imp Exp 
Trade 
Deficit- 
Surplus 
Imp Exp Trade Deficit 
TURKEY 97.06 79.76 17.3 107.5 87.32 20.18 96.46 105.51 9.05 (surplus) 109 106.34 2.66 
GREECE 69.6 49.8 19.8 76.4 52.5 23.9 77.6 56.1 21.5 70.7 52.9 17.8 
ROMANIA 36.01 26.25 9.76 42.38 28.75 13.63 51.72 36.74 14.98 44.36 34.1 10.26 
BULGARIA 21 16.3 4.7 24.68 18.29 6.39 28.41 20.64 7.77 23.6 17.42 6.18 
FYROM 3.32 2.39 0.93 4.09 3.02 1.07 5.01 3.35 1.66 4.4 2.92 1.48 
1 RO LEI=0.235 Euro, 1 MKD=0.016 Euro, 1 BU LEVA=0.511 Euro, 1 TYL=0.464 Euro  
Source: EU AMECO, own calculations 
 
Table 7: Trade deficit as % of GDP COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
TURKEY 4.91 5.1 2 surplus 0.5 
GREECE 9.28 10.4 8.85 7.2 
ROMANIA 12.4 14.05 12.64 8.6 
BULGARIA 18.62 22.13 22.8 17.65 
FYROM 18.71 18.9 26 22.22 
Source: EU AMECO 
 
2.4 Labour Market 
 
         2.4.1 Population and internal migration 
 
As we can see in Graph 5, there has been noted a considerable 
decrease in population growth and birth rate during the last 10 ten years. 
There is also a great difference in growth between the less 
(eastern) and more (western) developed regions in Turkey due to continuous 
domestic migration. The chance to find a job in eastern region is very small. 
As a result people are forced to migrate to the western regions of Turkey. In 
addition huge income inequalities are the main cause of migration from 
eastern to western regions. 
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Furthermore, the armed conflicts with Kurds, have forced a 
considerable amount of Kurdish population to migrate from western to huge 
urban centres. Only a very small percentage of them have returned back to 
their homes or villages due to the prevailing insecurity and instability in the 
eastern areas.  
“Other reasons for the rural exodus are the standard push-and-
pull factors (de Santis, 2003). The most important push factors are:  
• the large proportion of the population living in villages. 
• the relatively limited amount of arable land. 
• low agricultural productivity (the value added per worker in 
agriculture was one fifth of that generated in manufacturing in 1995). 
• poor quality of life and little expectation of future improvement 
(viz. the high infant mortality rate: 7-8% in the eastern regions as against 5% 
in the western regions).  
Among the most important pull factors are:  
• the high demand for labour in manufacturing, particularly in 
Istanbul and Izmir (about 1.3 million jobs were created by manufacturing and 
services over the period 1988-1994, and a further 1 million jobs over the 
period 1995-2000). 
• higher wages in manufacturing than in agriculture. 
• job security offering a continuous source of income and social 
security together with hopes of permanent, formally regulated employment. 
• the better quality of life in urban areas. 
• better access to subsidized public services (schools, health 
care). Yet another motivation for migrating to urban areas might be the further 
cuts in farming subsidies, given the need to keep public finances under 
control after the economic crisis in 2001”. 
 
Graph 5: Turkey: population growth and birth rate 
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There is also a significant difference in demographic structure 
(Gros D., 2005) between Turkey and EU especially in the ages before 14 and 
after 65 years, although there are similarities in the age between 15 and 65.  
People more than 65 years old amount to the 6% of Turkish population while 
the percentage in Europe is 17 %, due to the latter’s continuously ageing 
population.  
Additionally, contrary to the fact that (Gros D., 2005) Turkish 
population is always increasing the rate of this increase is always slowing 
down little by little. According to Graph 6 European population shows a 
considerably slow growth, while Turkish population has almost doubled in the 
last 30 years. The forecast for the next decades is that Turkish population will 
increase by 30%, something that proves that the population’s growth rate is 
slowing down. The fact is that Turkey will be in the future the most dynamic 
country concerning population in Europe.  
  
Graph 6: Demographic relations between Turkey and Europe 
 
 
Source: OECD, EUROSTAT 
 
        Furthermore, population (Gros D., 2005) is highly connected with 
economic growth if the unemployment rate is low. This means that if the 
population between 15 and 65 years old grows significantly and this specific 
part of population is employed, then the per capita GDP and economic 
development also increases. In that terms Turkey is considerably privileged 
against EU member countries which don’t have the same dynamic. 
As we can see in Table 8 Turkey has the lower ratio of total 
employment to total population even if the amount of employed people is the 
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highest, because of the lowest ratio in the 15-64 Age Group. Similar 
disparities can also be found in Europe and Sweden or Norway. One possible 
explanation for Turkey’s low rates is the small participation of women in the 
labour market. 
In conclusion, while the working age population has increased 
considerably, unemployment is high. What needs to be done in that case is a 
connection between working age population and high employment which will 
grant Turkey a demographic benefit against other countries and will have as 
result an economic development.  
 
Table 8: Employment concerning specific age groups, 2002 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Employment 
 
Table 9 shows employment by branch of activity in Turkey. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Employment by branch of activity 
UNIT: 1000 BRANCH OF ACTIVITY JAN 09 FEB 09 MAR 09 APR 09 MAY 09 
Agriculture fo-
resting hunting 
and fishing 
4.342 4.391 4.572 4.965 5.422 
Mining and 
quarrying 81 85 85 88 94 
Manufacturing 3.950 3.880 3.827 3.814 3.829 
Electricity gas 
and water 80 87 82 79 74 
Construction 990 976 1.062 1.157 1.296 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 4.444 4359 4.374 4.372 4.503 
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Transportation 
communication 
and storage 
1.033 1.040 1.052 1.074 1.116 
Finance insu-
rance and real 
estate 
1.215 1.265 1304 1.336 1.343 
Social and per-
sonal services 3.737 3.697 3.790 3.812 3779 
Source: CBRT 
 
The branches with the highest rate of employment of Turkish 
population are agriculture, foresting, hunting and fishing, manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail trade. All branches present an increase in the number of 
employees except from the branch of electricity gas and water which presents 
a minor decrease in May 2009.  
The table 10 shows the total labour force as percentage of 
population among countries which are already EU or EU pre-accession 
countries in the close vicinity of Turkey.   
 
Table 10: Total labour force as percentage of population COUNTRY 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TURKEY 33.23 33.6 33.74 34.17 35.10 35.48 
GREECE 44.38 44.52 45 45.27 45.52 45.68 
ROMANIA 47.57 46.46 46.87 46.65 46.46 46.51 
BULGARIA 50.15 50.49 51.65 52.14 53.21 52.9 
FYROM 38.12 38.58 39.31 40.24 40.68 41.16 
Source: ΕU AMECO own calculations 
 
        In this case, Turkey is behind countries such as Greece, 
Romania, Bulgaria even FYROM, contrary to the fact that Turkey is the 
biggest country concerning population . 
 
2.4.3 Informal employment 
 
Many Turkish workers are hired in the informal sector. (OECD, 
2008).Although their exact number cannot be identified the SIS has included 
an informal sector survey in its regular workforce.  
The declaration and integration of workers in the informal sector 
influences the rate of employment and unemployment in the country. There is 
a great doubt whether this has to be done or not. For example, (SIS, 2008) 
informal workers amount up to about 15% of total workforce. If somebody 
wants to include agriculture the percentage is higher. Informal workers 
(OECD, 2008) amount up to 50% of total employment including agriculture 
and about 40% excluding agriculture. In the aforementioned rates have been 
included workers who have no security at all, but again there are many doubts 
about their exact number because there is no official registration of them. The 
final number can very easily change if we take into account the foreign 
undeclared workers.  
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2.4.4  Part-time work 
 
The part-time work (SIS, 2008) in Turkey amount up to 10% of 
total workforce, while in European countries the same percentage is almost 
double. 
Additionally part time workers in Turkey outnumber part time 
workers in its immediate vicinity such as Bulgaria and Greece, but they are 
less in Romania. This happens mainly due to the small participation of women 
in the total workforce and labour market, and because of the fact that services 
sector in Turkey are not so much developed as in Europe. It is also a common 
policy for all countries that countries with developed services sector have high 
number of part time workers. 
 
 
Table 11: Employment patterns in selected EU countries and Turkey 
1990-2003 
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As we can see in Table 11, agriculture and fishing amounts up to 
32 % of total employment as against 3% for EU-15 in 2003. Turkey’s rate in 
this section is about similar to Romania’s rate. Industry and construction 
amounts up to about 21% of total employment for Turkey and EU-15. 
Furthermore, in 2003 services section in Turkey amounted to about 40% of 
total employment as against 63% in EU-15. Turkey’s rate concerning services 
sector is about the same with Bulgaria in 2003.   
.  
 
2.4.5 Unemployment 
 
Overall unemployment stood at an average rate of 10.3% in 2004 
that is less than Greece, Bulgaria and Poland, falling to 8.5% in 2007 (less 
than Poland- EU member state) and increasing steadily thereafter, reaching 
13,1% in 2009 which is the biggest rate among the countries listed in the table 
12, mainly due to the recent economic crisis. 
 
Table 12: Unemployment as percentage of civilian labour 
force among selected EU countries COUNTRY 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
TURKEY 10.3 10.2 9.9 8.5 9.4 13.1 
GREECE 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.1 
ROMANIA 8.1 7.2 7.3 6.4 5.8 8 
BULGARIA 12.1 10.1 9 6.9 5.6 7.3 
POLAND 19 17.8 13.9 9.6 7.1 9.9 
HUNGARY 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 9.5 
EU 16 9 9 8.3 7.5 7.5 9.9 
EU 27 9 8.9 8.2 7.1 7 9.4 
Source: ΕU AMECO,. SIS  
 
2.4.6 Labor market flexibility 
 
As we can see in Table 13 Turkey is a country with very small 
margins of flexibility (3.8), compared to countries such as France (3) and Italy 
(0.5). According to the table 13 the higher the flexibility indicator is the smaller 
the flexibility margin. Rich countries have usually more restrictive legislation 
which limits dramatically the implementation of flexibility. Turkey and UK seem 
to be an exception to this rule while Poland’s indicator (1.6) seems to confirm 
it.  
Table 13: Labour market flexibility 
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Limited implementation of flexibility establishes a significant 
barrier to a country’s economic development, because it is very possible for 
the companies to lose huge amount of revenues due to low wages. Formal 
legislation concerning flexibility in the labour market is mainly implemented in 
the formal sector. On the other hand, it can’t be implemented in the informal 
sector because nobody can really track and register the real number of its 
workers.   
 
2.4.7 Child labour 
 
The table 14 shows basic indicators of child labour force in 
Turkey. As we can see the employed children in 1999 between 6 and 17 
years amounted to 1630000, less than it was in 1994. The ratio of 
employment for this league of workers was 10,3% in 1999 and 15,2% Most of 
them work in rural regions, where there is less development and formal 
employment compared to the urban areas. There is also a significant 
decrease in the above figures in 2006 with the ratio of employment between 6 
and 17 years to drop to 5,9 %. This drop took place (Turkstat, 2006) because 
Turkey singed in 1998 the ILO Convention 138 according to which the 
minimum age of child labour was established to 15 years. A further drop took 
place in 2006 because of the ratification of ILO Convention 182, signed in 
2001. Another reason for this decrease in the reported rates is that in 1990’s 
there was a dramatic decline in the agricultural sector. 
 
Table 14: Indicators of the child labour force 
                Unit 1000 
October
1994
October
1999
2006
October-November-
December
Non-institutional civilian population 59.736 65.422 72.957
   Population between 0-5 age group 8.469 7.930 8.479
   Population between 6-17 age group 14.968 15.821 16.264
    Employed (6 years old and over) 20.984 22.124 22.963
    Employed (6-17 age group) 2.269 1.630 958
    The ratio of employment (6-17 age group) 15.2 10.3 5.9
          Urban 611 478 457
          Rural 1.659 1.151 502
          Male 1.372 955 632
          Female 898 975 326
          Agriculture 1.510 990 392
          Non-agriculture 759 640 566
          Regular or casual employee 648 617 513
          Self employed or employer 52 28 26
          Unpaid family worker 1.570 985 420
 
 
Source: Turkstat,2006 
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The main reasons that fuel child labour can be poverty, education, 
region they live, family tradition, culture, and population growth (Bulutay T., 
1995), (Tunali I., 1996). On the other hand children dealing with household 
chores (laundry, dishwashing, cleaning) come from poor families and 
contribute to the increase of the family income (ETF, 2004). 
      Graph 7 depicts the amount of employed children by sector. We can 
very easily notice that the number of employed children belonging to 6-14 age 
group decreases after 1994 due the relative legislation mentioned above.  
 
Graph 7: Employed children by sector 
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Source: Turkstat, 2006 
 
 
2.4.8  Migration 
 
From 1961 to 1973 Turkey signed many agreements concerning 
migration with countries such as Germany, France and Scandinavian 
countries. After the oil crisis that took place in 1973 the migration wave came 
to an end. Turkish migration was fuelled again after 1980, due to Kurdish 
refugees and refugees from Afghanistan Iran and Iraq seeking political asylum 
(OECD, 2004). 
Nowadays, most of the population tend to immigrate to 
Germany, Bulgaria and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Most of them 
come from rural areas. Nevertheless, over the last decade there has been an 
increase of immigrants with high education in European countries and the US 
(Kirişçi K. , 2003 and 2004). There is also a yearly migration of about 1000 
high educated people from Turkey to other countries (OECD, 2008). 
Over the two last decades, Turkey has also faced the problem of 
migration from neighbouring countries. Most of them work without any kind of 
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security and its number is estimated up to 1000000 workers (Kirişçi K., 2003). 
They are usually employed to agricultural works and household chores. 
It is also clear that most of the Turkish people migrate due to 
financial problems and this indicates that the strong immigration takes place 
due to low incomes, poverty and low development. What Turkey has to do in 
this case is to continue its reform process and achieve an EU-membership 
accession period without problems. Nevertheless, when and how EU 
membership can be reached is rather doubtful. 
 
 Tables 15 and 16 show the amount of immigration for male and 
female population by countries and by provinces 
 
Table 15: Immigration by countries 
COUNTRY MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
Germany 40670 33066 73736 
Bulgaria 12994 14476 27470 
Turkish Republic 
of Northern 
Cyprus 
8805 5039 13844 
Azerbaijan 4554 4573 9127 
Russian 
Federation 5606 3020 8626 
Source: Turkstat, 2009  
 
 
Table 16: Immigration by provinces 
PROVINCE MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
Ankara 10055 7605 17660 
Antalya 5269 4733 4733 
Bursa 9134 8814 8814 
Istanbul 24409 25235 25235 
Izmir 9440 8585 8585 
Source: Turkstat, 2009  
 
2.5 Trade Integration and human capital accumulation 
 
2.5.1 Trade integration and the EU-Turkey customs union 
 
Many experts (Gros D., 2005) hold the opinion that Turkey has 
been granted a “specific financial treatment”, mainly because of the Customs 
Union Agenda, described in Chapter 1, which later on had the possibility to 
lead Turkey to EU membership. 
Graph 8 below, delineates Turkish economy openness compared 
to Spain which is already a member state. As we can see, before 1980 Turkey 
had a closed economy. Exports of goods and services were no more than 5% 
of GDP. Thereafter its economy started to open because of its reform and the 
percentage climbed to 17% in 1984, 18% in 1988 and 22% in 1995. It seems 
that Customs Union in that case functioned really favourably for Turkey, 
because after 1995 the percentage boosted to 33% in 2001.  
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Graph 8: Openness in Economy for Spain and Turkey  
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Exports 
UNIT: % GDP COUNTRY 
2009 
TURKEY 23,97 
GREECE 21,5 
ROMANIA 28,6 
BULGARIA 51,2 
FYROM 43,84 
Source: EU AMECO, own calculations 
 
Table 17 presents the exports of Turkey in relation to the exports 
of other countries in its close vicinity for 2009. Turkey is behind countries such 
as Romania and Bulgaria, which are relatively new EU member states, even 
behind FYROM which is EU pre-accession member state. Many believe that 
the low performance of Turkey occurs because of its geographical position 
and this is a quite wise explanation. 
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2.5.2 Human capital 
The quality of labour workforce plays a significant role to the 
development of an economy (Gros D., 2005), because it is well connected 
with the so-called “human capital”. Table 18 show the total expenditure on 
education as percentage of GDP and the percentage of population with upper 
secondary education. In the first case Turkey (3,91%) is behind Portugal 
(5,69%) which is EU member state and behind even Poland (5,31%) and 
Hungary (5,15%)  which are relatively new members  
 
Table 18: Total expenditure on education and adult population with upper 
secondary education 
 
 
       In the second case Turkey (24,3%) is again behind Poland 
(45,9%) and Hungary (70,2%). 
      Table 19, on the other hand, shows the percentage of the population 
that has attained at least upper secondary education, by age group. The 
situation is about the same. Turkey is again behind countries such as Poland 
and Greece, which seem to emphasize on the upper secondary education, 
especially for the ages between 25 and 34 years old.   
 
Table 19: Percentage of the population that has attained at least upper 
secondary education, by age group 
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2.5.3 Physical capital 
 
Turkey’s investment in physical capital reached the rate of 27% 
of GDP in 1997, whereas at the same date countries of the EU had much 
lower rate (19%), according to the Graph 9. Unfortunately, Turkey did not take 
advantage of this high rate in order to achieve even higher economic 
development, mainly because (Kirişçi K., 2005) of the fact that politicians 
interfered with the above mentioned investment in such a point, so as to 
cause its distortion. As a result, those who kept their connections with the 
political system enjoyed the advantage of deriving cheap capitals in contrast 
to the others who didn’t. 
 
Graph 9: Investment as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
As a consequence the investments didn’t have the expected 
performance and a significant crisis followed. Summarizing, the right solution 
for Turkey to combat this kind of crisis is to find a mechanism to eliminate the 
corruption in governmental circles.    
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2.5.4  Institutions 
 
     Competitive indicators shown in Table 20 show us in simple 
words how the Institutions function within a financial system. As we can see 
below, even if Turkey is not an EU member state is ahead in competitiveness 
with a score of 4.16 and a rank of 61 compared to the score and rank of its 
immediate neighbours such as Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, 
Turkey has a lot of work to do concerning the transformation of Institutions in 
order to reach the European average. Transforming the Institutions 
presupposes the establishment of a healthy plan that might take many years. 
Some others support (Rodrik D., 2004) that if the reform of the Institutions 
begins, then the first indication of economic development will arise soon.     
 
Table 20: Competitive indicators  
 
 
Table 20: Global Competitive Index  
2009-2010 2008-2009 COUNTRY RANK SCORE RANK 
Switzerland 1 5.6 2 
Germany 7 5.37 7 
Spain 33 4.59 29 
Cyprus 34 4.57 40 
Hungary 58 4.22 62 
Turkey 61 4.16 65 
Romania 64 4.11 68 
Greece 71 4.04 67 
Bulgaria 76 4.02 76 
Source: World Economic Forum 
 
 
2.6 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
 
2.6.1  Introduction 
 
Although Turkey is a country in which foreign investors can 
increase their profits because of cheap workforce, updated communications 
and infrastructure, easy access to the most advanced labour markets, is not 
as attractive as somebody would expect concerning foreign direct investment.    
 
2.6.2 The Critical Role of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The main problem (Uppenberg & Reiss, 2004) of Turkey is that 
there is not enough generation of interior funds in order to finance the 
necessary investments so as to keep development rates in the appropriate 
levels according to EU standards. The problem for all EU member states is 
how they will finance new investments from national funds. The problem can 
be solved by feeding deficits of current account from funds emanating from 
FDI. These funds bear no similarity to other kind of funds (for example 
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domestic funds) and consequently Turkey cannot take advantage of them in 
short term basis.  
Furthermore FDI have a stronger potential than other investment 
a country might decide to finance. In case there is a lack of interior funds and 
infrastructure the acquisition of FDI is then crucial. Turkey has made over the 
last 30 years a remarkable effort to establish an integration plan with the 
economy of the rest of the world.     
The main barrier preventing foreign investors from investing in 
Turkey is an ongoing existing political and financial instability. Additionally the 
high degree of bureaucracy in Institutions and the inflexible legislation has 
kept FDI in low levels. 
When AKP took over (Uppenberg & Reiss, 2004) the 
administration decided to take the appropriate measures in order to facilitate 
FDI growth. In that sense a new legislation came into action according to 
which a brand new market was generated, according to the global needs and 
free of corruption. International standards were adopted in order to take into 
account their legal rights avoiding bureaucracy making the whole system 
more flexible.    
Additionally a Committee was set up in order to eliminate the 
barriers against FDI. This Committee was composed of the relative ministries 
representatives in order to accomplish its mission. The final result was 
remarkable. Turkey has now one of the simplest mechanisms for somebody 
who wants to create a business from scratch.  
         Table 21 shows the foreign direct investment rate as 
percentage of GDP among countries such as Turkey, Greece, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus. Turkey’s rate is between 0.2 and 
0.3% from 2003 to 2007, while Cyprus seems to have the highest rate among 
those countries.  
 
Table 21: Foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP COUNTRY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
TURKEY 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 - 
GREECE 
- 0.4 0.6 1.6 1.7 0.7 
ROMANIA 
- - - - 0.3 -0.1 
BULGARIA 0.1 -0.8 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.4 
SLOVAKIA 0.7 -0.1 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 
SLOVENIA 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.4 4 2.6 
CYPRUS 4.3 4.4 3.3 4.8 5.6 5.9 
Source: Εurostat 
 
         Turkey could quite well take advantage of the opening of the 
negotiations for full EU membership in order to improve the investment 
climate and increase FDI. The results could also have been extraordinary if 
the EU membership prospect would have been coordinated with the flexible 
legislation described above and updated technology infrastructure 
(Uppenberg & Reiss, 2004). Unfortunately, according to Table 21 the 
presented rates of Turkey are rather disappointing.  
         A significant factor which influences positively the FDI is how 
effectively governance is exerted. Rule of law, external liberalization and 
bureaucracy influence in turn the amount of foreign investments a country 
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retains (Kinoshita & Campos, 2004). The performance of Turkey concerning 
external liberalization and bureaucracy is rather disappointing (Dervis, 2004).   
 
2.6.3  FDI environment 
 
Domestic funds are attracted by a healthy FDI environment 
(UNCAD, 1999). It usually facilitates the domestic investments to become 
active and has some useful assets such as FDI laws, motives and investment 
development.   
In order to attract more investors, Turkey announced a plan in 
1995, according to which the investors would be granted a number of 
privileges. Although FDI legislation in Turkey is favourable to the alleged 
investors, is very poor concerning privatisation and infrastructure, which in 
turn prevented huge investments (Euromoney, 2000; Middle East Economic 
Digest, 1999; Institutional Investor Americas, 1999).  
        Table 22 shows the FDI environment for selected countries, such 
as Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Czech Republic, Poland and Russia. 
The higher the indicator is the worst the country’s performance. The worst 
countries are Poland and Russia. Ireland is the best performing country. 
Turkey is close to the average performance of the selected countries. 
   
Table 22: FDI  environment (ranking out of 47 countries) 
COUNTRY FACTOR IRELAND HUNGARY GREECE TURKEY CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
POLAND RUSSIA 
Protectionism 
does not pre-
vent import of 
foreign pro-
ducts 
5 24 14 14 18 38 46 
Foreign inve-
stors are free 
to acquire 
control in a 
domestic 
company 
2 14 15 17 20 38 46 
Foreign 
companies 
are treated 
equally to 
domestic 
6 34 15 14 36 45 47 
Public sector 
contracts are 
open to fo-
reign bidders 
2 18 22 15 27 34 47 
Cross border 
ventures can 
be 
negotiated 
with foreign 
partners 
3 12 15 24 27 43 45 
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Table 22: FDI  environment (ranking out of 47 countries) 
COUNTRY FACTOR IRELAND HUNGARY GREECE TURKEY CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
POLAND RUSSIA 
without 
government 
Investment 
protection 
schemes 
are available 
for foreign 
partner 
countries 
14 1 12 18 24 34 47 
Investment 
incentives 
are 
attractive to 
foreign 
investors 
1 5 29 19 36 15 47 
National 
culture is 
open to 
foreign 
influence 
9 20 19 28 42 29 30 
Immigration 
laws do not 
prevent 
employment 
of foreign la-
bour 
28 11 12 15 22 41 44 
Total 70 139 153 164 252 317 399 
Score 7.8 15.4 17 18.2 28 35.2 44.3 
Source: IMD 2005 
 
2.6.4 Political-institutional environment 
 
It is widely accepted that a healthy economic and political 
system facilitate FDI growth (Michalet C., 1997). As also mentioned above 
flexible FDI laws and the elimination of bureaucracy facilitate FDI. 
Additionally, there is a great amount of people in Turkey who have a lack of 
trust against FDI.    
Additionally, Turkey has low performance concerning 
institutions. When political instability is mixed with monetary instability and 
steady rise of prices then the final outcome is negative for FDI (Loewendahl, 
1998). Continuous inflation tantalizes Turkey over the past 20 years and 
undermines competitiveness, FDI and finally Turkey’s financial dynamic. 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL BARRIERS AGAINST EU 
MEMBERSHIP AND THE REFORM REVOLUTION  
 
3.1 Nationalism 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
        
       History has proved that nationalism has always been inherent in 
Turkey. The presence of this trend has been grown over the past centuries by 
political and military circles. This presence was further boosted when 
Armenian Journalist Hrant Dink was murdered in 2007. This paved the way 
for many articles in the public press and escalated the whole situation (The 
Economist, 2007). When after some time everybody was about to forget this 
specific event some other articles emerged to offer food for thought to the 
public opinion (Taspmar O., 2008). Because of this fact the European support 
for Turkey’s EU membership started to decrease once again. 
 
3.1.2 Nationalism in the 1990s 
 
Many experts wonder how the rise of nationalism in Turkey can be 
proved. Apart form the fact that Turkish public opinion is reserved about 
Turkey’s EU prospect there is also a common sentiment against United States 
of America. According to a recent exit poll half of the respondents said that 
they had the feeling that nationalism was rising and less than 40% that they 
had nowadays more nationalistic sentiments than in the past (Associated 
Press, 2007). 
Evidence that prove the rise of Nationalism can also be considered 
the killing of ethnic minorities. Apart form the murder of the Armenian 
Journalist, violent actions and murders took place against Christians and 
Catholics in 2006. Another factor that boosted nationalism was the election of 
National Movement Party (MHP) in Turkish Parliament. 
Furthermore there are four parties in Turkish Parliament three of 
which have nationalistic ideas, one of which is Party Kankaren Kurdistan 
(PKK).The ruling party Justice and Development Party is willing to find a 
solution to the problem having the vision of the EU prospect (Taspmar O. 
,2008). The opposition Party (Republican People’s Party) is increasingly 
opposed to the ruling Party, resulting in the rise of Nationalism. Armed 
conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish people also strengthen nationalism.  
The phenomenon of Nationalism is not new in Turkey and thrived 
in the 1990s. It is very important to examine the period after 1995 when 
military circles stressed the fact that Turkish Nation could be well threatened 
by Islamist and Kurdish nationalism (Ebru B., 2006). This is based on the fact 
that Turkish-Kurdish relation was escalated that specific period and the 
Islamist Party was elected in the Turkish Parliament. In addition to that, the 
sense mainly created by military circles, that the government had decided a 
political route in order to cope with the global opportunities and challenges, 
could very well render Turkey substitute to international organisations and 
Nationalism, grew as an antidote to that trend.     
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On the other hand (Ebru B., 2006) it is widely Known that political 
Islam is not compatible with Nationalism. This trend represents the Refah 
Party (Islamist Party) in Turkish Parliament. Furthermore Kemalism is closely 
connected with Nationalism and any kind of threat Kemalism is perceived as a 
general threat against Turkish Nation. Additionally there is common practice in 
Turkish political parties to bear nationalistic sentiments to form their political 
actions. Any form of political disagreement can very easily lead to a political 
recourse to nationalism. This is a very wise explanation why political turmoil 
can pave the way for a sharp increase in Nationalism.  
There are some major events that took place in the past and have 
Nationalism as a resort. The Economic Crisis and hyperinflation that took 
place in 2001 had as their successors Kurdish and Islamist trends, which 
could undermine severely Turkish Nation (Ebru, B., 2006). The sentiment of 
Kurdish threat disappeared after the political decline of PKK which lead to the 
capture of Abdullah Ocalan. As a result armed conflicts came to an end and 
peace prevailed for about five years. 
Furthermore, the ruling Justice and Development Party seemed to 
renounce Islamism and try mechanisms to avoid political conflicts and 
escalations. Of course we can’t ignore the fact that when the Izmit earthquake 
took place in 1999, the voluntary help to Turkey from other countries, 
especially neighbouring Greece, was a strong blow against nationalism, 
contrary to what political circles in Turkey supported. 
 
3.1.3  Nationalism during 2004-2008 period. 
 
After the recovery of 2001 economic crisis (Ebru, B., 2006) some 
major incidents leading to the decline of nationalism were very quickly 
forgotten. The Turkish economy started to develop continuously and after 
2004 PKK decided to restart armed conflicts and escalate tension with 
Turkey. The whole atmosphere looked alike the events of the 1990s. Armed 
conflicts were culminated in 2007 with Kurdish demonstration protests and the 
creation of a new terrorist group named Freedom Falcons of Liberation 
Hawks. They were supposed to be a PKK branch. This group assumed the 
responsibility for bombing action that took place in 2005 and 2006, causing 
violence, terror and political instability.   
The US invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the fact that US denied to help 
Turkey to destroy PKK installations in northern Iraq, was partly a reason for 
the escalation of the tension. This situation strengthened the hostile 
sentiments against the West and reinforced nationalism. Furthermore that 
specific period had already started a legislative European pressure against 
Turkey for the global recognition of the Armenian genocide during the First 
World War. The timing of all those events was a significant determinant, which 
caused political turmoil, instability and insecurity for the Turkish population 
which considered nationalism as a defence mechanism.   
 
3.1.4 Nationalism and the EU 
 
       There are many people wondering why the rise of nationalism 
could undermine Turkey’s EU prospect. If we trace back the political 
experience of the past two decades nationalism is not in favour of Turkey’s 
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European prospect. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) are bearers of strong nationalist sentiments. 
Nevertheless, according to an exit poll which took place in 2003, people 
favourably attached to these parties were in favour of Turkey’s EU 
membership, although the two parties are widely against European prospect 
of Turkey. (Negris C., Taml B., 2005). The strange thing is that the supporters 
of these two parties are more fervent supporters of Turkey’s European 
prospect than the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Carcoglou A., 2003). 
Nevertheless, increasing nationalism undermines Turkey’s EU membership.  
Additionally, the idea of EU membership is a matter of pride for 
Kemalists because according to their beliefs, Turkey’s integration in Europe 
will automatically cause its westernization (Bardakci M., 2007). Apart form 
these beliefs the European dream of Turkey still seem to be remote, mainly 
because opposed European partners seem to underestimate Turkey’s 
potential (Visier C., 2006). This hostile attitude of some European partner has 
been considered from Turkish people, social and political circles as an open 
opposition of Europe against EU membership of Turkey. In other words many 
believe that Europe does not want Turkey to be integrated EU and that in 
some cases they are treated in a different way than other EU pre-accession 
countries (Akcapar B., 2007). 
      The fact that Turkey rejected to open the Turkish Cypriot borders in 
2006 slowed down the opening of negotiations and this was a strong blow for 
Turkey. The blow became even stronger when Cyprus was accepted as a full 
member by the EU, despite the fact that Annan’s plan was rejected by 
Cypriots. Many also hold the opinion that Turkey’s EU prospect fuel 
nationalism in Turkey. According to a recent exit poll, most of Turkish people 
believe that one of the main reasons for the rising nationalism is the negative 
attitude of other EU member states against their country.  
      The rise of Nationalism because of the European prospect is a 
significant barrier against huge efforts of the ruling party to achieve the reform 
in the financial and political system of Turkey, despite that some of its 
members bear anti-European sentiments. The transformation the government 
operated had a remarkable effect (Taspinar O., 2008) on Turkish population, 
because its main goal was to support and secure the interests of Turkish 
citizens.  
      As the AKP became during the next years stronger and stronger it 
seemed that EU support was not so necessary for the government because it 
had already strengthened its electoral base. Interesting Turkish national 
issues emanating from its culture and tradition such, as the “headscarf issue’’, 
(Bardakci M., 2007) has always been treated with scepticism in European 
circles. The opening of some chapters concerning the negotiations criteria did 
not necessarily mean a favourable treatment concerning EU integration. The 
road is long and there still a lot of things to be done.  
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3.2 The Kurdish question 
 
3.2.1 EU objectives  
 
       The European Union is interested in Kurdish problem mainly 
because of Turkey’s geographical and strategic position. Many issues 
tantalizing Turkey for many years and is of great concern to European 
partners have to do mainly with financial and political instability fuelled by 
Kurdish issue. This in turn could cause unpleasant developments in the 
immigration wave and the Turkish Iraqi borders.  
The European Commission proposed the two opposite sides a 
peaceful solution to the problem which included generalities and without 
reinforcing violence by the formal recognition of the Kurdish identity. 
(European Commission, 1998). Later Turkey’s EU progress reports suggested 
that the conflict could be solved by taking further measures to support human 
rights of Kurdish people such as freedom of expression or the return of the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) (European Commission, 2004).  
Since then Turkey’s progress reports have become even more 
concrete and are mainly focused on human rights. European Union 
Committee puts a particular emphasis on the elimination of race 
discrimination, the freedom to express, associate and have religious beliefs.  
The protection of minority rights is also a priority for EU. They have 
also suggested the elimination of corruption in order to ensure healthy 
governance. They have proposed active political Kurdish representation in 
Turkish Parliament, which will advocate democracy. (European Commission, 
2007). 
 
3.2.2 The evolution of the Kurdish issue 
 
        There is a great interest to examine how and to what extent 
Turkey implemented EU’s suggestions. In the late 1990’s many measures 
were taken in order to solve the problem, with a view to the protection of 
human rights according to EU directives. “This solution included the following 
measures (Joseph J., 2006): 
•  The freedom to publish and broadcast in Kurdish 
• Private and public education in Kurdish 
•  The freedom to establish and operate Kurdish civil society 
associations, freedom of assembly and freedom of expressing non-violent 
political opinions 
• Freedom of torture and access to fait trial. The abolition of 
state security courts. The abolition of the death penalty. 
• Compensation and IDP return. 
• Leading the state of emergency in law and practice and 
abolishing the village guard system. 
• A general amnesty for all militants. 
• Freedom to establish and operate political parties and a 
reduction 10 percent electoral threshold. 
• The reduction of regional disparities and promotion of 
socioeconomic development in the southeast including through local 
autonomy”. 
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Τhe aforementioned proposal found its fervent supporters to PKK 
as an antidote to the fact that the specific period PKK was in decline 
especially after the capture of its leader. In the late 1990’s the People’s 
Democratic Party (HADEP) emphasized to the fact that Turkish government 
had to deal deeply not only with the human rights of Kurdish people but the 
human rights of other ethnic minorities. Additionally the party stressed the 
need to examine thoroughly the existence of multicultural entities in the 
Turkish nation. The same party supported full separation from Turkey, despite 
the fact that all this situation had nothing to do with PKK. There was a great 
opposition of Turkish people against these beliefs, while most of them 
considered that only the Kurdish problem could be solved on human rights 
basis approach. If the Kurdish problem had been faced on a collective basis 
referring also to other minorities, this would have put Turkish ethnic identity at 
stake.  
Turgut Ozal had set up (Joseph J., 2006) a plan in the early 1990’s 
based on fundamental human rights. The plan bore fruits because armed 
conflicts were eliminated, private property of Kurds was protected, torments 
and terror came to an end. This plan was established through radical 
transformation in the legislation and constitution of Turkey.  
The right to speak and write in languages other than Turkish was 
allowed. Significant reforms also took place in the judicial system according to 
the international standards. Nevertheless, some parts of the legislation 
remained intact in order to prevent the separation of the state.  Of course 
there have been some cases concerning the judicial system, according to 
which the reformed law was implemented partially or there had been much of 
misinterpretation. These cases brought about the strong protests of Kurdish 
side, who felt that there was a huge violation of their rights.   
Furthermore the new judicial system foresaw the existence of 
translators in the Courts and the re-examination of cases that had been 
judged in contrary to the International Standards and International law. Death 
penalty was also abolished. There are many Kurdish people that were 
benefited from the new legislation and achieved the re-examination of their 
cases in the European Court of Human Rights.  
According to the new measures the creation of an association 
serving Kurdish interests was also allowed. A supplementary legislation came 
into action in 2005, putting a ban on associations that advocate identities 
attached to culture or religion. Later on, the teacher’s association stopped to 
function because they didn’t teach in Turkish language. 
As far as political parties are concerned, the new legislation was 
more flexible concerning its creation by receiving financial help of the state. 
Nevertheless, the virtual legal basis for constituting a political party and the 
language (Turkish) used in political meetings, Parliament or political debates 
in the media remained unchanged. Furthermore, the Turkish National Court 
decided to abolish HADEP on the grounds that this political party undermines 
severely the Turkish national cohesion and identity, causing political turmoil.  
Notable reforms had been made in the area of the cultural rights. 
The parents had the right to name their children according to their wish. 
Nevertheless they had the obligation to use letters of the Turkish alphabet. 
Letters of the Kurdish alphabet were restricted. Art creations were also 
limited. Concerts and festivals by Kurdish were prohibited. The legal argument 
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supporting these actions was that art works especially Kurdish could very well 
undermine the integrity of Turkish Nation. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress the importance of the reform 
process concerning the rights of other ethnic minorities. And it did not happen 
because of the immediate benefits it offered to Kurds. Nowadays, Turkish is 
the only language formally recognized in schools and universities. The 
question about human rights of all minorities is relatively fresh. However, if we 
try to isolate this event, it really shows the extent of reforms that nowadays 
take place in Turkey. (Sub committee on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights, 
2004). 
The reform process also allowed the media to broadcast in foreign 
languages. The legislation concerning the broadcasting was restricted later on 
by another supplementary law, according to which broadcasting was allowed 
under specific terms, for example the content of the broadcasting had to be 
approved first by the Turkish state.     
Another provision for the Kurds the new law included was the fact 
that Kurdish language was only allowed in private lessons. This language was 
forbidden to be taught formally in schools and universities of Turkey. The 
reform created multiple problems that had to do with the overall function of the 
schools and universities. Finally the little amount of private school was forced 
to close down because of economical barriers.  
Concerning the situation in Turkish Iraqi borders in 2003, the 
emergency state had been established and the escalation was huge, mainly 
because of the US attack in Iraq and fervent return of PKK. This caused the 
Turkish army to deploy after five years of ceasefire. The legislation in this 
case facilitated the return of the internally displaced persons and provided for 
their compensations. As far as compensations were concerned though, the 
criteria were thoroughly examined and the height of compensation was low. 
The facilitation of the IDP return on the other hand, was highly deterred from 
its initial goal it was planned in the first place by significant barriers such as 
poor infrastructure.  
A significant effort was also made to achieve a reliable reform in 
the public administration area. This reform started in 2004 and stopped some 
months later because of president’s veto. Nevertheless, a number of laws 
were voted to diminish corruption and promote accountability. The 
government decide to proceed to the establishment of twenty six new 
provinces according to the implementation of a new development plan 
(Ertugal E., 2005). Despite the fact that these efforts were made, the Turkish 
state has still a centralised administration and there are still a lot to be done 
for further improvement.  
 
3.2.3 Things to be done 
 
The most practical EU’s suggestions towards the commonly 
accepted solution has to do with the creation of mechanisms that will facilitate 
the exercise of the above mentioned human rights and a strict ban on various 
misinterpretations and distortions of the amended legislation.    
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3.2.4  EU-Turkey relations 
 
The fact that the Turkish question has widely been spread in 
Europe and to what extent it has been achieved is based on the motives that 
exist between EU-Turkey relationships.   
The Kurdish issue drew little or no attention of Europe (Joseph J., 
2006) in comparison with other ethnic minorities in European countries and 
became widely known only when the problem became sharp. Despite the fact 
that minority issues in Central and Eastern Countries are highly connected 
with security breaches in Europe, the Kurdish question was not treated in the 
same way by Europeans. When PKK was reactivated after the five years 
ceasefire while the September 2001 events had already taken place, Europe 
was less sensitive to the Kurdish question.  
Many doubts about the political influence Europe exerted on 
Turkey were widely spread among the Turkish political circles because 
Europe was unwilling to integrate Turkey as a full member. These doubts 
were common secret and were never published openly and were fuelled by 
significant events (in 1997 the European Commission rejected Turkey from 
the opening of negotiations for EU membership and accepted negotiations 
with other Central and Eastern Countries)   
Although Turkey made hard efforts to achieve its reform in political 
and financial system according to Copenhagen criteria, new criteria seemed 
to show up. These new criteria stemmed from the fact the ongoing turmoil in 
Turkey could bring about a relocation of European population to Turkish 
provinces and a security breach in Europe.  
There was not a secret disagreement of Europe against 
integration. A formal procedure was established, the EU membership talks 
started in 2005 and since then a yearly report about Turkey’s progress is 
issued (EU Commission, 2005). This had a twofold result. Firstly the directives 
stemmed from the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria have forced 
Turkey to proceed to radical reforms in order to catch the EU dream. 
Secondly, the EU-suspicion phenomenon described above was a food for 
thought for nationalists, which posed the argument that although Turkish 
government is trying hard to achieve full membership there is also a strong 
possibility of Europe to reject Turkey in the near future.     
 
3.3 The Armenian Question 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Although the Armenian question is not closely connected with 
international standards and chapters Europe has imposed on Turkey to 
implement, the whole issue gains more publicity and draws the attention of 
the global media. 
 
3.3.2 The dilemma of the Armenian genocide 
 
       According to Turkish side about three hundred thousand 
Armenians died during the First World War, whereas Armenian side supports 
that the number comes up to 1.5 million. The question is whether the loss of 
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the Armenian population during the Turkish Armenian armed conflicts was 
genocide or not. If genocide has been committed, Turkey will be to obliged to 
give out high compensations to Armenia. Turkey refuses the whole story 
contrary to Armenia which fervently supports it (European Stability Initiative, 
2006).   
Turkish beliefs about the whole issue became widely known to 
European circles mainly in 2000 due to the growth of Turkish confidence to 
Europe on the road to full EU membership. Many conferences took place to 
extensively examine the issue, many writers spoke about the Armenian 
question. Anyway, Turkey does not accept the term genocide and Kemal 
Ataturk is alleged to be against genocides according to Hurriyet. 
The events in the Turkish Iraqi borders due the US invasion in Iraq 
drew again the attention of European public opinion in Turkey, while Turkey’s 
EU prospect crashed on Cyprus issue. Additionally Armenian issue came 
again to the forefront via some writer’s comments in the media (such as 
Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak) talking about Armenian’s genocide. These 
declarations caused their prosecution from the Turkish state for “insulting 
Turkey”. 
Turkey was the receiver of much political international pressure to 
admit the Armenian genocide. Nevertheless, this kind of pressure leads to 
extremely opposite results than expected, because although Erdogan’s Party 
used to generally be willing and re-examine issues of the past, showed rising 
reluctance to do it. Prominent Armenian people said that distorting the history 
via political interference could prevent Turkey from European integration.    
Nobody knows what the political consequences will be in the future 
because of the unresolved Armenian issue. In Europe nobody supports 
Turkey’s points of view concerning the issue. Additionally, the issue is treated 
with rising reluctance in diplomatic circles. In that way, it is obvious that 
Armenia has won the combat of public opinion. Consequently, according to 
what Turkey believes, there is further need to promote the issue.  
Bridging the gap between the two sides is a long-lasting 
procedure. This effort will probably need the mediation and support of EU 
actors in view of Turkey’s EU prospect and Armenian confirmation that 
territorial or other claims are their main target. Trying to put an end to the 
problem without any solution is not the issue. What Turkey has to do is 
treating fairly to its history, increasing its reliability to its European partners 
and improving in that way other sections of political and financial life. Turkey’s 
potential concerning advanced ideas is huge, but has to be careful so as not 
to cause history distortion.     
 
3.3.3 The way Turks face the issue 
 
      Many countries hold the firm opinion that the Turkish acceptance of 
the Armenian genocide will open the gates of the European dream. Even if 
the Turks have killed less than 1.5 million people the fact is that they showed 
a great deal of misbehaviour. “Killing between 600.000 and 900.000 
Armenians remains a horrible thing (McCarthy J.,1995)”. The Armenian 
American lobby will probably find it very easy to track down the events and 
prove that genocide has been committed. 
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      On the other hand, even the EU prospect gives Turkey many 
political and financial benefits. The more these benefits support Turkey’s 
position on the issue the better for Turkey. What would be the best outcome 
for Turkey is the deletion of the issue, something that would alleviate Turkey’s 
position.    
 
3.3.4 Turkey-Armenia relations 
        
       Armenia was recognised by Turkey in 1992, but in 1993 closed its 
borders because Armenian troops entered the Azerbaijan borders. Turkey put 
a pressure to Armenia to withdraw its troops and the borders are closed since 
then (Crisis Group Europe Report 166,167, Sep, Oct 2005).. Only in October 
2009 after long-lasting negotiations between the two sides did the two sides 
reach an agreement to open the borders, under the auspices and mediation of 
the US.   
 
3.3.5  Potential Solution 
 
A proposal was brought (Emerson M., Tocci N., 2004) to the 
negotiation table, generated from the Turkish side, according to which 
Armenian and Turkish sides would decide whether the events of that periods 
were genocide or not. The proposal was not welcome by the Armenian side, 
who in turn believed that there is no room for negotiations in historian facts, 
because otherwise they can very well be easily distorted. The other problem 
was that no archive referring to the events could be available. As a result, it is 
undoubted on what extent the proposal could be successful.  
       On the other hand, the fact is that the Armenian problem exists 
and is an unpleasant stain to Turkey’s European future. What Turkey needs is 
flexibility in its political will to reach a commonly acceptable agreement with 
Armenia. Turkish politicians’ beliefs “genocide is out of the question” does not 
help the whole situation. 
Opening the Turkish Armenian borders in October 2009 was a 
very sensitive issue because it is closely connected with the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. This conflict resulted in many people leaving their homes in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, heading for territories which were occupied by Armenian 
army. The fact that Armenia did not recognise Turkey’s eastern borders and 
the Armenian genocide issue made Turkey to close the borders with Armenia. 
Consequently, what has been achieved recently is of high importance, 
because for so many years this territory has been in decline and 
underdevelopment. Now a new prospect has shown up, which will help the 
two countries improve their relationships, their trade and their economy. 
In any case, what Turkey definitely wants to avoid is the word 
“genocide” because according to the International Law this kind of recognition 
will fuel the Armenian requirements for re-examination of the Turkish 
Armenian borders and financial compensations to the assassinated families. 
Turkey is also willing to establish a ceremony honouring the Armenian dead 
people. All these thoughts are surely not enough to succeed and satisfy the 
Armenian side. Copenhagen criteria will probably serve its purpose by helping 
or making Turkey to restore good neighbouring relations with Armenia, on the 
road to the EU (European Stability Initiative, 2006).   
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Nowadays, most of European countries are negative against the 
European prospect of Turkey. This negative European attitude can be very 
well eliminated if for example a fifteen or twenty year time table towards 
Turkey’s European integration is set up. Turkey has done well with the 
sensitive issue of Cyprus. If Turkey continues to proceed with its economic 
and political reform and improves the relations with the Armenians and the 
Kurds, then the European prospect will be much easier.   
This political and economic reform has to continue either with or 
without the European prospect. Some others believe that Turkey will gain the 
EU membership only with its geographic and strategic position. Apart from 
that what Turkish population has to realise is that no country is accepted to 
the EU, without first having restored friendly relations with its neighbouring 
countries. All three aforementioned factors are very critical for Turkey’s 
European course and have to be very well understood by the Turkish citizens.  
 
3.4 The Cyprus Problem 
 
3.4.1  Historical Background-Cyprus’s EU membership  
 
After the Turkish invasion in the northern Cyprus and the island’s 
division in 1974 Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot position. As a result of 
the Turkish occupation in the island Turkish Cypriot entity was created in the 
northern part of the island. The Turkish reinforced military presence in the 
island and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC) gave the impression to everybody that Turkey had the first say to the 
whole issue, something that was taken advantage by Cypriots in a diplomatic 
way (Bahcheli T., 2006). 
On the other hand the Republic of Cyprus was the only 
internationally recognised entity. This was a great advantage of Greek 
Cypriots to put pressure on Turkey through international organisations and 
other diplomatic channels to achieve Turkish troops’ withdrawal. The 
presence of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus does not honour Turkey and 
damages Turkey’s image to the European public opinion. Nevertheless, 
Turkey decided to keep its military presence, which resulted in the closure of 
the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot borders. The northern part of the island 
faced significant economical problems and Turkey decided to provide 
economic support in order to keep it alive.   
What followed next was a UN presence in the island in a 
peacekeeping mission. Turkey definitely rejected a European involvement in 
the island because Greece could negatively influence EU against Turkey as a 
European partner.  
The first application of Republic of Cyprus for EU membership took 
place in 1990 and was rejected because it was crashed against fervent 
objections of Turkish Cypriot side mainly triggered by Turkey, which took legal 
actions against the Republic of Cyprus’s EU membership. Furthermore, if 
Cyprus was to become a member of EU, Greece would enjoy more privileges 
than Turkey (Mendelson M.H., 1999). EU did not agree with Turkey’s 
objections, but anyway, EU had no intention of inaugurating a new EU 
member without a commonly accepted resolution.  
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EU actors found a great difficulty in finding a commonly acceptable 
solution. Finally the EU decision to proceed with the examination of Cyprus’ 
EU membership was a result of productive Greek diplomacy and the pressure 
Greece posed to the EU. Additionally, the fact that Greece raised its veto 
against Turkey’s Customs Union was regarded by many diplomatic circles the 
main reason for the beginning of the European course of Cyprus. The next 
European blows to Turkey were the rejection of the opening of the 
negotiations and the acceptance of the opening of negotiations with Cyprus. 
Although the process of the European integration of Cyprus was 
ongoing, Turkish political circles kept alive the hope that Cyprus would have 
been rejected from the European prospect because of the division of the 
island and the unsettled differences between the Cypriot and Turkish side. 
Apart from that, the resolution of the conflict was considered crucial for the 
European process of both Turkey and Cyprus (Nugent N., 2000).  Turkey also 
firmly believed that Cyprus’ EU membership would also mean the recognition 
of the Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot side, 
which would also trigger TRNC’s EU accession process. Nevertheless, this 
hope was eliminated by the decision taken in the Helsinki Summit, according 
to which Cyprus’ resolution conflict would alleviate Cyprus’ road to the EU 
membership. However, if no agreement could be reached, the resolution of 
Cyprus’ problem wouldn’t be prerequisite for full EU membership (Helsinki 
European Council, 1999). 
Finally the Copenhagen Summit validated Cyprus’ accession on 
December 2002. Many efforts that had later been made in order to change 
what had been decided in Copenhagen on behalf of Turkey or other mediating 
countries did not bear fruits. What EU actors always used to stress to Turkey 
was that an unresolved conflict between the two sides would severely 
undermine Turkey’s EU membership.  
       
3.4.2  Turkish policy on Cyprus issue. 
 
In November 2002 the new Erdogan’s government assumed the 
administration of the country and the debate about the policy followed 
concerning Cyprus’ issue was still fresh. Some days later Anan’s plan 
providing for a resolution to the problem showed up on the negotiating table. 
Additionally, US invasion to Iraq was in process and the new inexperienced 
government was really burdened with many decisions that had to be made in 
quite short period. 
The new government set EU membership as its main goal. We 
have to bear in mind that AKP, the new political party, came into power after a 
period of deep economic crisis, which caused economic instability all over the 
country. Most of the majority of Turkish people was in favour of Turkey’s EU 
prospect at that specific period (Carkoglou A.,Krinsci K., 2002). AKP stressed 
that political and economic reforms were necessary to improve people’s living 
standards and well-being. Ethnic minorities also were in favour of Turkey’s 
European prospect because their human rights would further be secured.   
Additionally, we have to mention that the AKP was in favor of the 
Turkey’s EU membership, despite the fact that many leading members were 
against EU integration in the past. Some years ago its former leader 
considered EU as a Christian club and the main belief of the party was that 
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Turkey’s principles have to stay away from EU threat (Robins Ph., 2003). 
Thereafter, the AKP’s policy changed, the dream of EU membership became 
the main axis of its decisions and reacted positively to European requests to 
decrease the military authority in Turkey. The Turkish army, on the other 
hand, was also in favor of Turkey’s EU prospect on the understanding that EU 
membership could facilitate and secure Turkey’s territorial rights. The Turkish 
military also helped the government to implement its reform policy (Phillips D., 
2004).      
AKP tried to gather parliamentary unanimity (Milliyet, 2002).on its 
policy concerning EU membership, something in what governments of the 
past definitely failed. The previous government was in favor of a settlement 
based on the reunification of the country. Erdogan fervently believed that he 
couldn’t achieve an effective resolution of the conflict without the help of the 
UN. He also believed that he was not in favor of the policy followed in the last 
years by Turkey and that he would do its best to achieve a viable solution to 
the interest of his country.     
The Anan’s plan proposed in November 2002 was accepted by 
AKP as a starting point for negotiations. The opposition party (CHP), the 
Turkish armed forces and Turkish president Sezer were against this political 
decision. In order to support and justify its political movement, AKP stressed 
the large autonomy TRNC population would have in the new federation and 
the sustainment of the Turkish rights. The group opposed to the Anan’s plan, 
on the other hand, stressed that after the implementation of the plan no TRNC 
will exist and that security problems for the Turkish Cypriot people will arise 
emanating from the absence of the Turkish army in the area. 
The opposition the Turkish government (Milliyet, 2002) faced was 
well coordinated and gave enough space to those who were against the plan. 
Many explain this weakness of the government as a lack of experience. 
Accepting the plan meant that many objectives that had to with Cyprus had to 
be abandoned. The previous governments followed a TRNC supportive 
policy. TRNC’s leader, Denktash, was in favor of a two-state policy in the 
island. Within Turkey some politicians were in favor of that policy and some 
others believed that supporting inflexible Denktash’s policy could further 
undermine Turkey’s EU prospect.     
Erdogan’s government was in a very difficult position. Firstly 
because Cyprus’ EU membership was nearly sure. Secondly, because it had 
to confront with the public opinion’s accusations concerning undermining 
TRNC’s population interests. Thirdly, it was a receiver of strong pressure on 
behalf of the international mediators pushing the government to convince 
Denktash to approve the proposed plan. 
Fortunately the above accusations failed to survive and discredit 
the reliability of the government, because the media and other important 
social groups in Turkey were in favor of the Anan’s plan. As a result, the 
efforts of the opposition groups to act against the AKP were ineffective. Many 
newspapers wrote the Anan’ plan would highlight Turkey’s victory (Milliyet, 
2002). 
Many political circles were of the opinion that Cyprus problem’s 
cost was too high for Turkey to pay because it was closely connected with 
Turkey’s EU membership. They also doubted the value of Turkey’s 
commitment to Denktash’s choices, which in many cases did not necessarily 
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mean that they were to keep pace with Turkey’s interests and visions. In fact, 
Denktash did not receive the wide acceptance of all political circles in Turkey. 
The fact that he rejected the Anan’s plan proved his rigidity and that he didn’t 
care much about Turkey’s EU prospect. It also damaged his image, because 
his political decisions were against the common political will in Turkey. As a 
result he started losing publicity and the support of his funs. 
Although the fact Denktash’s fame seemed to (Milliyet, 
2002).decrease in Turkey, he received strong support from the military, at the 
same time when the AKP put a pressure on him to accept the plan. Despite 
the strenuous efforts of UN Secretary General for commonly accepted and 
viable solution, no agreement was reached. What Anan tried to do was to 
achieve individual terms for each side and support Cyprus’ EU membership. 
Additionally, if the full majority of the Turkish Cypriot population was in favor of 
the plan, it would be a very good reason for Denktash to compromise. 
Nevertheless, Denktash didn’t live up to Anan’s expectations and finally 
rejected the plan.   
The fact the Anan’s plan was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side, 
paved the way for Cyprus’ EU membership without its northern Turkish 
occupied part. The final result was also welcomed by Greek Cypriot side, 
which was also reluctant to adopt the plan.    
The failure of the Turkish government (Bahcheli T., 2006) to 
achieve an agreement is attributed my many politicians to the government’s 
inexperience to deal effectively with the issue. Some months later the 
government tried to convince Denktash to re-examine the negotiations with 
Greek Cypriot side, based on the Anan plan, and to achieve UN Secretary 
mediation in case the whole effort proved to be ineffective.   
The failure of another agreement to the Cyprus problem followed 
the proposal of another amendment plan by the Secretary General. The vast 
majority of the Greek Cypriot side voted against the amended plan, highly 
influenced by the Greek Cypriot President. They had nothing to lose because 
Cyprus’ EU membership without including the northern part of the island had 
already been guaranteed. On the other hand, the vast majority of the Turkish 
Cypriot side voted in favor the plan, despite the opposition of Denktash who 
was fervently against it. Finally the Republic of Cyprus was accepted as a full 
EU member on 1 May 2004. Turkish Cypriots were rejected, despite the fact 
that they were in favor of the Anan plan. 
 
3.4.3 The Cyprus issue in relation to Turkey’s EU prospects  
 
       Despite the difference in the overview of the Anan’s plan between 
Erdogan and Denktash, the first achieved via his political movements to gain 
the political yes of the Cypriot Turkish regarding the plan. On the other hand, 
the rejection of the plan on behalf of the Greek Cypriot side, promoted the 
Cyprus’ unresolved issue to a major obstacle towards Turkey’s European 
course. Additionally, the Republic of Cyprus as a new EU member state had 
the advantage and the power to use the available legislation and influence 
against Turkey’s EU membership and towards further isolation of the northern 
part of the island. 
The President Papadopoulos’ decision to impose (Bahcheli T., 
2006) an economic embargo upon the Turkish occupied part of the country 
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sharpened the above situation. He also had the power to raise his veto 
against Turkey’s EU membership to extract future compromises of Turkey, 
regarding a new settlement of the issue. He also demanded from Turkey to 
recognise that the Republic of Cyprus was the only legal administration in the 
island.   
       The case of the Turkish recognition of the Cyprus Republic was 
out of the question because it would surely damage severely Turkish Cypriot 
interests in the island. On the other hand, a bilateral resolution of the conflict 
bore no resemblance to the long-lasting and strenuous efforts of the United 
Nations, striving for a viable resolution of the conflict. This recognition could 
bring about a sharp opposition in Turkey because of its sensitivity.       
       The Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos showed increasing 
reluctance to re-examine the Anan plan or a similar settlement of the kind. 
The fact that Cyprus was an EU member functioned in favour of Cyprus, 
which was in favour of an EU political resolution rather than a UN resolution. 
The comparative advantage was in favour of Cyprus and against Turkey and 
the TRNC. The only proposals to which Papadopoulos proceeded were those 
that he was sure they would have raised huge Turkish political objection.   
Greek Cypriot side could as a new EU member state prevent 
Turkey’s EU membership by negatively influencing EU partners for reasons 
that had nothing to do with Cyprus issue. As a result, mass opposition of the 
European public opinion and some European countries were raised against 
Turkey’s EU prospect. The French and the German prime ministers were 
openly against Turkey’s European future. They also proposed a special 
relationship between Turkey and the EU which was not accepted by Turkey 
(Bahcheli T., 2006).     
       The AKP was and is determined to pursue a full EU membership, 
despite the opposition raised by some European countries. Nevertheless, it 
doesn’t mean that Turkish public opinion will remain in favour of Turkey’s EU 
prospect in the near future, because Turkey has been requested by EU actors 
to proceed to compromises, which have not been requested by other EU pre 
accession countries. Turkish people believes that there is a without precedent 
discrimination against Turkey. A representative example is considered by 
Turkish people the EU demand, concerning the recognition of Armenian 
victims during the First World War as genocide.  
       What Turkey cannot come to terms with is the fact that although 
Turkish Cypriot side were in favour of the Anan’s plan was left out of the EU 
and became later a significant barrier against Turkey’s EU membership, that 
is, although Turkish Cypriots showed good political will towards the conflict 
resolution they were rejected.  
Nevertheless, Turkish government is determined to achieve full EU 
membership. Although this concept is not nowadays as popular as it was a 
decade ago because of the rising Euro-sceptism and the rising suspicion 
against Europe, the Turkish government is willing to find  a commonly 
accepted and viable solution towards the conflict resolution of the Cyprus’ 
issue. Its resolution will definitely pave the way for the fulfilment of the 
European dream, sponsored by radical political and economic reforms.    
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3.5 The reform revolution 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
The fact that Turkey gained its EU candidacy in 1999 triggered the 
political will of the government towards legal reform (Keyder V., 2002). The 
fact that the acquis communautaire chapters were established as main 
principles and prerequisites towards EU membership intensified Turkey’s 
effort to continue and adopt the European International Standards in its own 
domestic legal system. Everything in the interior room of ministries reminded 
of European influence and all employees seemed to be accustomed with the 
European prospect of Turkey. A representative change has been done in the 
sensitive area of the National Security Council. There has been achieved a 
significant change in its ruling law and its structure, something that was a 
long-lasting effort.    
 
3.5.2 Legal reforms 
 
According to some of the most important reforms, the Kurdish 
language was allowed, rights of the prisoners and people in trial were 
recognised and legal reforms were promoted to improve the relationship 
between husband and wife. Furthermore the death penalty was aborted in 
accordance with European standards. Some more amendments of the legal 
system dealt with cultural and minority rights, freedom of expression, prison 
conditions and torments taking place in the prisons and during capture. All 
these reforms were put into action from 2001 to 2006 and highlighted an 
enormous progress in Turkey’s EU accession. 
Many reforms also referred to the recognition of specific rights of 
women within the family, such as easier divorces, equal fortune claim and the 
withdrawal of the recognition that the husband had necessarily to be the head 
of the family (Crisis Group Interview, 2007)   
A new penal code was promoted in compliance with EU 
regulations. This came as a shock to everybody because it reinforced the 
group of women and received a unanimous acceptance. An effort made by 
the prime minister to sustain the legal regulations about juvenile crimes did 
not finally succeed, because of a vivid reaction of the Turkish public opinion. 
(European Stability Initiative, 2007). 
The legal amendments concerning broadcasting were including 
severe restrictions concerning published websites, which had the intention of 
undermining the national identity and integrity of Turkey. The reforms did not 
give any more space to non-Muslim and orthodox entities. The legalisation of 
the Alevi and Bektaci union was a further step towards legal reform, but it was 
considered rather reserved.  
The following table shows some major events as a result of the 
progress made concerning legal reforms in many domains of Turkish social 
life between 2001 and 2006. Additionally about 9000 cases concerning 
human rights’ violations were against Turkey, because many people had 
recourse to the European Court of Human Rights as a result of the legal 
reform. 
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Table 23: Major events as a result of the legal reform 
YEAR EVENTS 2001 2006 
Association 
closure 145 6 
Police raids 
against 
associations 
216 48 
Seizures of 
publications 341 21 
Freedom of 
expression cases 3473 1013 
Source: EU Commission, 2005 
 
 
3.5.3 Women’s rights 
 
Ataturk’s vision for a modernized Turkish state allowed women to 
vote and reinforced the disappearance of the female headscarf. Nevertheless, 
often were the cases according to which second and third marriages were 
reported and honour killings of women were committed. Trying to check 
equality between men and women Turkey is far behind the European 
standards, meaning that there is a lot of work to do towards this direction 
(World Economic Forum, 2006). The implementation of the legal reform 
started in 2001, paved the way for women’s in rights in education, marriage, 
property and divorces. This policy was fervently supported by AKP and is still 
ongoing. 
Although AKP’s policy to openly express its opposition to the 
headscarf, Gul’s wife used to wear it and this sharpened the debate about the 
headscarf. The truth is that according to a 2006 research the amount of 
Turkish women without a headscarf has increased in the last fifteen years 
(Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çarkoğlu, 2006). 
  
3.5.4 Education reforms 
 
       The Copenhagen Criteria include no Chapters concerning 
education; nevertheless, Turkey’s effort was focused on this specific area in 
order to keep up with European standards, although Turkey is far behind them 
(Ministry of National Education, 2002). Serving the purpose of reaching EU 
standards, the Turkish government initiated an effort to change the existing 
situation of the educational system  
There has been made a remarkable effort involved the National 
Ministry of Education and the UN, according to which many children 
especially girls coming from the eastern underdeveloped regions of Turkey 
were induced to attend the educational programmes at schools.  The “let’s go 
to school” motto that had been made up finally succeeded in its mission. More 
and more Turkish people tended to believe that education is one of the most 
important areas that will boost the European course of Turkey. 
The EU recognises that “better education of Turkey’s young 
population develops workers who may offset the ageing of EU societies 
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(European Commission, 2004)”. Educational programmes such as Erasmus 
influence positively the young students and help them acquire EU driven 
mentalities and points of view, having as a prerequisite the close cooperation 
between EU and Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 4: CURRENT SITUATION CONCERNING TURKEY’S 
EU MEMBERSHIP PROGRESS  
 
    The following table summarizes in the best way the latest progress 
concerning Turkey’s EU Membership in main areas of economic and political 
criteria: 
 
 
Table 24 :  Latest Progress concerning Turkey’s EU Membership 
ECONOMIC AREA OUTCOME 
Existence of a fun-
ctioning market eco-
nomy. 
Economic policy has been agreed and coordination 
has improved. 
 
Macroeconomic sta-
bility. 
Macroeconomic stability is sensitive to shocks, 
because of the huge external instability. 
Interplay of market 
forces. 
There has been made significant progress in 
privatisation. 
Market entry and 
exit. 
Some progress has been made. 
Financial sector de-
velopment. 
Remarkable Progress has been made. 
Sectoral and enter-
prise structure. 
The structural transformation of the economy has 
proceeded relatively well, especially in the area of 
privatisation. 
State influence on 
competitiveness. 
There is a considerable influence of state in 
competitiveness. 
Economic intergra-
tion with the EU. 
Turkey is connected with huge trading and investment 
partnerships with the EU. 
POLITICAL AREA OUTCOME 
Public administration Needs modernization. 
Civilian Oversight of 
the security forces. 
No progress has been made. 
International human 
rights’ law. 
No significant progress has been made. 
Torture and ill-
treatment 
Limited efforts have been made. 
Prison conditions. Need further improvement. 
Freedom of assem-
bly. 
Is compatible with EU directives but some problems 
remain to exist concerning its implementation 
Freedom of asso-
ciation. 
Some improvements have been made but there are 
some difficulties because of judicial barriers. 
Domestic violence 
and forced mar-
riages. 
Remains a problem because of women’s reluctance to 
have recourse to the police. 
Children’s rights. Significant progress has been made. Further 
improvement needs to be done concerning the juvenile 
system. 
Property rights Initial progress has been made. There are still barriers 
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in its implementation. 
Minority rights No progress has been made 
Cultural rights Initial progress has been made. There is still room for 
further improvement. 
Source: EU Commission, 2005 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Economic Costs and Benefits for Turkey 
 
The cheap workforce, the proximity to the Eastern European market 
and Turkey’s geostrategic position will boost internal investments and foreign 
direct investments into Turkish industry. Sponsored by the proper 
technological infrastructure, foreign direct investments will become really 
effective for the development of the Turkish economy. Furthermore, the free 
movement of labour closely working together with low labour costs are 
expected to bring about a massive outflow of workers abroad and a huge 
inflow of foreign investments. Additionally, the great amount of industries need 
restructuring, which will increase competitiveness, comparing to other EU 
economies.  
 
5.2. Costs and Benefits for the EU 
 
    Inherent traits of Turkey are high birth rates, low productivity, 
unemployment, inflation and gross public debt. Turkey’s EU membership 
would make EU deal with all these problems, something that could influence 
negatively the economies of the other EU partners. All these problems need 
enough money to be resolved something that entails the outflow of money 
from the European Funds to Turkey. The extremely high birth rates are bound 
to create problems to the European institutions. 
    Additionally, Turkey’s EU accession will also cause a dramatic increase 
in migration rate towards EU countries, especially Germany where the vast 
majority of Turkish immigrants exist. This could also increase the delinquency 
rates in Germany caused by extremist groups against Turkish immigrants. 
The EU could well react against it, by prohibiting migration until Turkish and 
EU wages reach the same level, but this is a long-lasting effort. 
    Furthermore, Turkey’s EU membership will make the decision making 
process more complicated within the EU Parliament. This will take place 
because each member state will have less power and influence concerning 
this process, because the EU Parliament will have more members. 
On the other hand, the big size of Turkish population, the great 
potential and dynamic of Turkish economy, the low labour costs and technical 
infrastructure  are significant factors EU actors can take advantage to achieve 
further economic development, via enterprise activities and the creation of 
new businesses. 
It is also undoubted that Turkey’s position is of great geostrategic 
importance. Firstly it can bridge the gap between the Eastern Asia and 
Europe and contribute to the establishment of security and stability in the area 
against the threat of terror and Islamic fundamentalism. The recent war 
broken out in Iraq was a vivid example of its geostrategic position. Secondly, it 
controls the gas pipelines from the East to the West, rendering Turkey an 
important factor concerning energy resources.   
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5.3 Economic domain 
 
Despite the fact that the Turkish economy is of great potential 
compared to other countries’ economies, as shown in Chapter 2, the 
stabilization of its development will be caused only when it will be connected 
with EU membership. Turkey has made great strides concerning the 
implementation of economic reform, especially after the 2001 economic crisis 
and the healthy targets and visions the AKP has set since then. This effort 
has in some cases been stained by events, which have delayed the reform 
process because the government didn’t manage to isolate them. The 
interference of politicians in the economic system of the country makes the 
corruption thrive and that is what Turkey needs to get rid of in order to achieve 
full EU membership.    
What Turkey has achieved by now, is based on the above mentioned 
economic reform imposed by EU actors. In that way, prosperity, high wages 
and incomes and elimination of poverty can prevail in Turkey. The outcomes 
of the economic development seem to be visible and can be more visible in 
the near future in case the government is not distracted from its main goal, 
especially by domestic factors. 
Additionally, a sustainment of FDI between 3% and 4% of GDP could 
be significant factor towards EU membership, via private investments and 
perhaps some help from EU. As a result, growth rate could be multiplied 
because more capital inflows can be imported to the country. A decrease in 
the FDI inflows surely has to do with wrong policy credited to the government. 
 Furthermore, what Turkey needs to achieve the goals of the Growth 
and Stability Pact is a virtual reform in its fiscal system and policy, which is 
mainly dictated and coordinated by a centralized common fiscal policy for all 
EU countries. EU requirements are important towards viable public finances, 
but they have to be adjusted to the national needs and interests.  
The implementation of a tight fiscal policy and the reform of the fiscal 
legacy according to the European standards, will pave the way for the 
investments to increase in Turkey. Keeping the inflation rates in low levels will 
ensure monetary stability emanating from the stability in the real exchange 
rates.  Coordinating the fiscal policy with a healthy monetary policy is the key 
answer to the question how growth and economic development can be 
sustained in the long run.    
  
5.4 Political domain 
 
It is undoubted that Turkey’s EU membership crashes against its 
political system, culture and tradition of its government institutions. The 
government institutions are many times unwilling to reform and cooperate 
towards EU course. Regional interests are put high in the agenda against the 
interests of the Turkish state. Lack of transparency prevails, which prevents 
the governmental mechanisms from implementing the reform. 
The Cyprus conflict is also a major barrier towards EU membership, 
mainly because of the military occupation of the northern part of the island. 
EU will definitely not accept a new member that sustains troops in the territory 
of another EU member state, unless a Turkish army withdrawal from the 
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country is achieved. Furthermore, Greek Cypriot side has the power of veto 
against Turkey’s EU membership as an EU member state, each time rules of 
good neighboring are violated between the countries.    
On the other hand the relatively recently emerged Armenian issue has 
cast a dark shadow on Turkish history and functions negatively towards EU 
membership. What is still pending is whether the events in 1915 will be 
characterized as genocide, which entails terrible economic and political cost 
for Turkey.  
The Nationalism phenomenon arises each time there is mistrust against 
EU and when EU puts pressure on Turkey to implement reforms and accept 
regulations that have not been applied to other EU pre accession countries. 
This kind of the alleged prejudice against Turkey spreads nationalism in 
Turkish society. 
Nationalism is closely connected with the Kurdish issue, which is a 
prime example of violation of human rights, minority and cultural rights. The 
fear of separation of Turkish national integrity by ethic minority groups 
hampers the ongoing reforms, provokes terror and atrocities and influences 
negatively the EU public opinion about Turkey’s European future.  
 
5.5 Closing remarks  
  
    While Euroskepticism is inherent phenomenon in Turkish society as 
explained above, in the same way Turcoscepticism is well spread in Europe 
and the debate about Turkey’s EU membership is heating up. Many 
prominent EU politicians believe that Turkey’s EU membership will highlight 
the end of Europe. Whether this point of view is extreme or not, the fact is that 
nobody can be sure about the consequences after Turkey’s integration. The 
main reason is political, macroeconomic and monetary instability of the 
Turkish state, which prevent European countries from supporting full EU 
membership. While economic reforms have effectively been implemented 
despite emerging barriers, there are still a lot to be done in the political 
domain of the country, mainly because of the barriers discussed in Chapter 3.   
    The opening of negotiations period is a very good opportunity for 
European and Turkish states to reconcile the two different worlds and 
cultures. During this period they can find out what they expect from each 
other. They can also learn from each other but it is undoubted how long this 
period will last. This synthesis will definitely be productive some time in the 
future. When this will happen mainly depends on how quickly political and 
economic reforms can keep up with the European standards and to what 
extend the social, political and economic mechanisms are prepared to come 
to terms with the European concept. The compatibility of Turkish standards 
with the European ones will bring the two worlds closer and will facilitate 
Turkey’s EU prospect. But the final outcome of these reforms will be judged 
not only by the resemblance they bear to the European standards, but also by 
how effective they can be concerning the well-being of ordinary Turkish 
people.    
But, on the other hand, instead of searching the economic figures and 
the political system of Turkey to assess Turkey’s progress towards EU 
membership everybody has to wonder: Shouldn’t we search how economies 
and political systems are structured in Islamic countries, on which traditions 
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and peculiarities they are based, the regional banking and trading rules and 
how mature enough they are to undergo a radical transformation? The years 
to come will prove whether this is feasible or not. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AI Amnesty International 
AKP Justice and Development Party 
CBA Collective Bargaining Agreement 
CEEC Central Eastern European Countries 
CHP Republic People’s Party 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
DTH Democratic Society Movement 
DTP Domestic Society Party 
DSP Democratic Left Party 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEC European Economic Community 
EP European Parliament 
ESI European Stability Initiative 
ETF European Training Foundation 
EU European union 
EUSG Secretariat General for EU Affairs  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FYROM Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia 
GDFI Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HADEP People’s Democratic Party 
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities 
IAMSAR International Aeronautical Maritime Search and Rescue 
IANC International Air Navigation Committee 
ICAO International Civil aviation Organization 
ICCPR International Convention for Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
IDP Internally Displaced Persons 
ILO International Labor Organization 
IMD Institute for Management Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IMD Institute for Management and Development 
ISKUR Turkish Labour Organization 
JMPR Judicial Modernization and Penal Reform 
LGBTT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transexual 
MDG Millennium Development Goal 
MEP Member of European Parliament 
MHP National Movement Party 
MTFF Medium /term Fiscal Framework 
NGO Non- Governmental Organization 
NOTAM Notification to Aircraft  
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OPCAT Optional Protocol Convention Against Torture 
PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
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RIA Regulatory Impact Assessment 
RTUK Television Supreme Council 
SEE State Economic Enterprises 
SME Small and Medium Enterprise 
SHCEK Social Services and Child Protection Agencies 
SIS State Institute of Statistics 
SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
SSDF Defense Industry Support Fund 
TAK Liberation Hawks 
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus  
TUSIAD Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
